SECRET — REL NATO — EXERCISE — THIS IS A FICTIONAL DOCUMENT

OPERATION STRAY LIGHTS

BALTIC JAMMING

Two wars' lost drones over four countries, one long night, and three governments that each own the right to fire

FIG. 1 · BALTIC AIR DEFENCE AREA, 251600Z



WGS 84 · ICAO 1:1 000 000

D-DAY	DURATION	FORCE	ROE
25 NOV 2026 · 1600Z	24 HOURS	13 FIGHTERS · 16 SAM UNITS	WEAPONS HOLD BY DEFAULT

COMMAND: MODERN OPERATIONS · SCENARIO BY TOTOBIMBO · 2026 OPORD 26-058 · 250900ZNOV26

OPERATION ORDER 26-058

OPERATION STRAY LIGHTS — DEFEND THE AIRSPACE OF ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA AND SOUTHERN FINLAND AGAINST DRONES THROWN OFF COURSE FROM THE WAR IN UKRAINE, AND MEET RUSSIAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT ON THE LINE; 25–26 NOV 26

ORIGINATOR	Commander, NATO Combined Air Operations Centre Uedem (CAOC Uedem), on behalf of Allied Air Command (AIRCOM, Ramstein)
DATE-TIME GROUP	250900ZNOV26
SERIAL	CAOC-UE/OPS/BAD/26-058
ADDRESSEE	Commander, Baltic Air Defence (COM BAD), at the Control and Reporting Centre Karmėlava, Lithuania
INFO	Estonian Air Force, Air Operations Control Centre (Ämari) · Latvian Air Force, Air Operations Centre (Lielvārde) · Lithuanian Air Force, Airspace Control Centre (Karmėlava) · Finnish Air Force Command (Tikkakoski) and Karelia Air Wing (Rissala) · Italian Air Force detachment, Šiauliai · Turkish Air Force detachment, Ämari · NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force, Geilenkirchen · Multinational MRTT Fleet, Eindhoven · Swedish Air Force, Blekinge Wing F 17, Ronneby
REFERENCES	A. AIRCOM directive, Baltic Air Defence mission, August 2026 B. ROE STRAY LIGHTS, peacetime air defence profile, edition 1 C. INTSUM CAOC-UE 26-329, 250700ZNOV26 D. National fire-authorisation arrangements: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; Finnish standing authority, 24 NOV 26 E. NOTAM in force, Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius and Helsinki FIRs F. Meteorological and astronomical forecast, 250600ZNOV26 G. AIRCOM reinforcement reserve, allocation of 250800ZNOV26
ANNEXES	A · B · C · D · E · F · G · H · J · K · L · M
APPENDICES	B/1 Intelligence overlay · C/1 Operations overlay Bound as landscape sheets after Annexes B and C.
TIME ZONE	ZULU throughout. Local time in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland is UTC+2; Kaliningrad UTC+2; Moscow and Minsk UTC+3.
MAP REFERENCE	ICAO 1:1 000 000 aeronautical charts, Baltic sheets · WGS 84 · positions in degrees and decimal minutes
COPY	Copy 2 of 24

RECORD OF CHANGES

NO	DTG	CHANGE	AUTHORITY	ENTERED BY
01	250730Z	Annex A paragraph 1 and Annex H paragraph 5: the four Finnish F/A-18C at Rissala (**ILVES**) and the Helsinki NASAMS battery are placed under COM BAD for the period. **They alone may fire over Finland**, on a standing Finnish authority; nobody else may.	FINAF Cmd	Maj LINDQVIST
02	250810Z	Annex H paragraph 2: a national fire authorisation, once granted, runs **six hours** (three in the draft of 24 NOV). Agreed by Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius.	CAOC-UE/LEGAD	Maj LINDQVIST
03	250830Z	Annex D paragraph 3: the Estonian IRIS-T SLM platoon is in **Ida-Virumaa**, facing the Narva axis, not at Tallinn. Two Giraffe radars added, at Jõhvi and Võru.	EST AF AOCC	Capt RÄTSEP

DISTRIBUTION

ADDRESSEE	COPIES	MEANS
COM BAD, CRC Karmėlava	1–3	Secure signal
Commander, Italian detachment, Šiauliai (LUPO)	4	Secure signal
Commander, Turkish detachment, Ämari (PARS)	5	Secure signal
Karelia Air Wing, Rissala (ILVES), through Finnish Air Force Command	6–7	Secure signal, REL FIN
Estonian Air Force, Air Operations Control Centre, Ämari	8–9	Secure signal; for the Estonian batteries and radars
Latvian Air Force, Air Operations Centre, Lielvārde	10–11	Secure signal; for the Latvian batteries, the wall and the radars
Lithuanian Air Force, Airspace Control Centre, Karmėlava	12–13	Secure signal; for the Lithuanian batteries and radars
NATO AEW&C Force, Geilenkirchen	14	Secure signal, extract: paragraphs 1 to 3 and 5, Annexes B, C and J
Multinational MRTT Fleet, Eindhoven; Blekinge Wing, Ronneby	15–16	Secure signal, extract: paragraph 4, Annexes A, C and G
Ministries of defence, Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius and Helsinki	17–20	Liaison officers, paragraphs 1 to 5, Annexes G, H and K
AIRCOM, Ramstein	21	Secure signal
CAOC Uedem registry	22–24	Registry

> This order is issued under the Baltic Air Defence mission. **NATO is at peace, and no state of hostilities exists with anyone.** The drones that will cross tonight are the debris of somebody else's war: Ukrainian drones aimed at Russia and thrown west by Russian jamming, Russian drones aimed at Ukraine and thrown north by Ukrainian jamming. Neither is aimed at us, and both can kill. **The right to fire in a country's airspace belongs to that country's government**, which lends it six hours at a time. The task is to bring down what threatens people, where it can fall without harm; not to shoot at everything that flies.

1. SITUATION

a. Adversary forces

(NR) No state of hostilities exists. The heading is doctrinal. **Ukraine is not an adversary**; its drones are in our sky by accident. Russia and Belarus are not at war with the Alliance; their drones are in our sky by accident too, as far as this staff can show.

(NR) **Tonight.** Kyiv has announced a large strike on the oil terminals of **Ust-Luga and Primorsk**, in the Gulf of Finland [A1]. Russian jamming will throw some of those drones into **Estonia, Latvia and Finland**, as it has since March. Russia is launching its own wave on Ukraine **through Belarus** [B2]; Ukrainian jamming will throw some of those into **Lithuania and south-east Latvia**, as it did on 15 September. The hour of neither is known.

FLOW	WHAT IT IS	WHERE IT COMES IN	ASSESSED AXES
UKRAINIAN STRAYS	Long-range strike drones, piston engine. **They carry a warhead as a rule**	From Russia, across the eastern borders of Estonia and Latvia and into the Gulf of Finland	Narva · Lake Peipus · Latgale · Gulf of Finland towards Kotka
GERBERAS	Russian foam decoys, piston engine. **Most carry nothing; some carry a warhead**	From Belarus, into Lithuania and south-east Latvia	Vilnius · Kaišiadorys · Daugavpils

(NR) **On radar the two look the same**: a small target at about 80 knots, some 300 metres up, on a slow and erratic course. Nobody can tell an armed drone from an empty one before it comes down. Annex B paragraphs 2 and 3.

(NR) **Russian military aircraft.** Russian fighters transit the Gulf of Finland corridor between the mainland and Kaliningrad. On 18–19 March a Su-30 violated Estonian airspace near **Vaindloo** for about a minute; on 23 September a Mi-8 from Kaliningrad crossed 300 metres into Polish airspace for 42 seconds [A1]. **Expect both kinds by day on the 26th**, near Vaindloo and along the Kaliningrad border [B3]. They are manned, they are state aircraft, and **they are never targets**.

(NR) **Jamming.** Satellite navigation is jammed daily over the Baltic [A1]. Sources are assessed near **Kingisepp** and in **Kaliningrad** [B2]. A notice to airmen is expected this evening for Ida-Virumaa, the Gulf of Finland and the Lithuanian–Belarusian border. It is the cause of the night, not an attack on us.

a. Adversary forces (continued) — most likely and most dangerous

(NR) **Most likely.** Over the night, in waves and with long gaps, a dozen drones or more cross the line on several of the seven axes at once. They wander. Many turn back or leave again; many come down in fields, forest or the sea when their fuel runs out; a few come down on a town or on something that matters. A further Russian wave at dusk on the 26th cannot be excluded: Russian waves on Ukraine have come at nightfall. By day, Russian aircraft test the line.

(NR) **Most dangerous.** A warhead on a town or on a sensitive site with nobody warned and nothing done; or a shot of ours that brings wreckage down on a town, crosses the border, or hits an aircraft with a crew in it. *The staff notes that the second begins with something we do.*

(NR) **Posture.** Russian and Belarusian weapons are assessed held towards the Alliance B2. Moscow and Minsk will deny every launch and will call any shot of ours near the border an attack.

b. Friendly forces

(NR) Task organisation at Annex A: **thirteen fighters** on three bases (four Italian Eurofighters at Šiauliai, **LUPO**; five Turkish F-16s at Ämari, **PARS**; four Finnish Hornets at Rissala, **ILVES**); **sixteen ground-based air defence units** of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Helsinki; **fifteen surveillance radars**. Air defence plan at Annex D.

(NR) **A NATO E-3A (NATO AEW 01) is on station** over the Lithuanian–Polish border until 260000Z. It shares its picture with the CRC; **it is not under COM BAD's orders**. Paragraph 5 and Annex C paragraph 5.

(NR) **AIRCOM holds a small reserve** for the night: a relief E-3A, a tanker, two Swedish Gripens. It does not cover all three. Paragraph 4c.

c. Attachments and detachments

(NR) ILVES 1 to 4 and FI NASAMS HELSINKI attach for the period, Record of Changes serial 01. The Turkish detachment ends its tour on 30 November. **Latvia has no medium-range system**: its IRIS-T is ordered, not delivered. **No ship is assigned.** Annex A paragraph 7 records what was asked for.

d. Civil considerations and environment

(NR) **The governments.** Three Baltic governments answer to their parliaments for every drone that comes down on their soil and for every shot fired over it. **Each keeps the authority to fire in its own airspace** and lends it to COM BAD on request, for six hours at a time, Annex H. **Riga is fragile**: the last government fell in May after the Rēzekne fuel depot was hit with no alert given and nothing fired [A1]. Tallinn is steadier; Vilnius watches what its allies' missiles are spent on. **A government that loses confidence in this headquarters can take its airspace back**: no more authorisation, its batteries held. Helsinki has given the Finnish units a standing authority and asks only that nobody else fires over Finland.

(NR) **What they want** is the same in all three capitals: nothing exploding on their soil, no wreckage on their towns, the population warned in time and not for nothing, and no fire without their say.

(NR) **The public.** Each Baltic government raises a public air-raid alert on COM BAD's advice: sirens and telephones, people in shelter, the airport closed, the trains stopped, two hours at a time. In May the first Lithuanian alert sent parliament to the shelters, and a single alert near Helsinki kept nearly two million people indoors [A1]. An alert saves lives when a warhead comes down, and costs the country money and patience when nothing comes. Annex K.

(NR) **Civil air traffic.** Airliners of airBaltic, Finnair, LOT, SAS and Ryanair fly between Riga, Helsinki, Vilnius and Tallinn and come in from Warsaw and Stockholm, at about 9,000 metres and 430 knots, all night and all day. **They are far above the drones and nothing like them.** Annex E.

(NR) **Fourteen sensitive sites** are marked on the plot: power stations, a nuclear plant and a former one, gas and fuel storage, an LNG terminal, two ports, four airports. Annex D paragraph 2.

(NR) **Light and weather.** The operation begins in full darkness, runs through **a night of about fourteen and a half hours**, a day of about seven, and ends two hours after the next sunset. The moon is full, above seven-tenths of cloud. Air 2°C, no precipitation. Annex L.

2. MISSION

(NR) **COM BAD defends the airspace of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and southern Finland from 251600Z to 261600Z against drones thrown off course from the war in Ukraine, brings down those that threaten towns and sensitive sites where they can fall without harm and with the authorisation of the government concerned, and meets any Russian military aircraft that tests the line, without firing on a manned aircraft and without anything of ours crossing the Russian or Belarusian border, in order that four governments keep their skies and their people, and that nobody is handed an incident.**

3. EXECUTION

a. Commander's intent

(NR) Since March these drones have hit a power station chimney, a fuel depot and a government. Since August the mission is called Baltic Air **Defence**. **Tonight four capitals expect it to deserve the name, and none of them will forgive a mistake made in their sky.**

(NR) **Purpose.** No warhead on a town or a sensitive site; no wreckage of ours on one either; the governments still with us at the end; nothing for Moscow or Minsk to hold up.

(NR) **Method. Ask before you need it**: a government takes time to answer, and an authorisation that arrives after the drone is of no use. **Identify before you fire**: a unit on Weapons Tight fires only at what is held hostile, and what you declare hostile will be shot at. **Choose where it falls**: where a drone comes down matters more than whether it does; open country or the sea, never a town. Hold your fire while it crosses one. **Spend the cheap weapon first**: a rocket, a shoulder-launched missile or a gun on a foam decoy; a Meteor or an AMRAAM only when nothing else will reach. **Keep the fighters for what only fighters can do**: the places no battery covers, the tracks nobody can identify, and the Russian aircraft by day. **Warn in time, and not for nothing. Stay inside the line**: no aircraft, no missile, no exception.


(NR) **End state.** At 261600Z the drones that threatened people have been brought down over open country or have left; the population was in shelter where a warhead did come down; every shot was fired under a government's authorisation, inside its airspace, at a drone; the Russian aircraft were met and seen off; the three Baltic governments still lend their authority; the magazines are not empty.

(NR) **We do not fire on an aircraft with a crew in it.** Not a fighter in our airspace, not a helicopter over our soil, not an airliner that looks wrong. **I accept a drone that gets through before a shot that should not have been fired**, and I accept a violation that is only filmed before an aircraft that is brought down.

b. Concept of operations

(NR) The operation runs twenty-four hours in four phases set by the light, with three continuous tasks. Annex C sets out the phases, decision points and control measures; Appendix 1 to Annex C draws them. **COM BAD sets his own patrols, his own weapon states and his own requests**: this order lays down no combat air patrol station.

SYNCHRONISATION



(NR) **Phase 1 — Evening: set (from 251600Z).** Read the picture. Decide which governments to ask, and ask them early enough that the answer is there before the first track. Decide where the E-3A is most use and whether it is to be relieved at midnight. Put fighters where the batteries are thin. Everything is on Weapons Hold until COM BAD says otherwise.

(NR) **Phase 2 — Night: the waves (to 260600Z).** Tracks appear beyond the line and cross it. Identify, wait for open country, engage with the cheapest weapon that reaches, hold over towns. Renew each authorisation before it runs out. Raise an alert where a track threatens people. **At 260000Z the E-3A leaves** unless relieved. **At 260600Z the three capitals count the night.**

(NR) **Phase 3 — Day: the line (260600Z to sunset, about 261350Z).** Rearm and count what is left. **Russian aircraft fly by day**: have a fighter where it can meet them, at Vaindloo and along the Kaliningrad border, and bring it home on our side. Late drones may still be airborne. The last requests to AIRCOM close at 261200Z (fighters) and 261300Z (tanker).

(NR) **Phase 4 — Dusk (sunset to 261600Z).** Be ready for another wave from Belarus at nightfall: authorisations in force before dark, batteries and fighters placed, missiles left to meet it.

(NR) **Continuous — the governments.** An authorisation in force wherever a shot may be needed, and none asked for nothing, Annex H. **Continuous — the line.** Nothing of ours beyond it, Annex C paragraph 4. **Continuous — the missiles.** Counted, and spent in order of cost, paragraph 4a and Annex D paragraph 5.

c. Tasks to subordinate elements

ELEMENT	TASK
LUPO 1–4	Italian Eurofighters, Šiauliai. **Lithuania and Latvia.** Cover what the batteries do not; identify tracks the E-3A cannot; meet the helicopter on the Kaliningrad border by day. Meteor and IRIS-T: **the Meteor is the last choice against a drone**. **Never fire over Finland.**
PARS 1–5	Turkish F-16s, Ämari. **Estonia.** The Narva and Lake Peipus axes, which the E-3A's southern orbit does not cover; meet Russian fighters at Vaindloo by day. No targeting pod: they close to identify. **Never fire over Finland.**
ILVES 1–4	Finnish Hornets, Rissala, about 25 minutes from the Gulf. **Finland: the only fighters that may fire there**, on the standing Finnish authority. Over a Baltic state they need that state's authorisation like everyone else.
GRIPEN 1–2	Swedish JAS 39C, **if asked for**, paragraph 4c. Same rules as the other fighters; never fire over Finland.
Estonian air defence	Five units. **The Narva axis** and the Auvere power plants; Tartu. The IRIS-T platoon is the only medium-range system in Estonia and Latvia.
Latvian air defence	Six units. **The drone wall** on the border, with its rockets and cameras, and three RBS 70 platoons at Rēzekne, Daugavpils and Riga. Short range only.
Lithuanian air defence	Four units. **Two NASAMS** at Vilnius and Kruonis, RBS 70 at Visaginas and Šiauliai.
FI NASAMS HELSINKI	The capital and Helsinki-Vantaa. Fires on COM BAD's order with no further authorisation.
Surveillance radars	Fifteen. Detect and track; report every slow low track to the CRC. **They do not identify.**

d. Coordinating instructions

1. (NR) **H-hour is 251600Z.** End of operation 261600Z, or on order. The opening message from CRC Karmėlava at H-hour takes precedence over this order.
2. (NR) **Everything starts on WEAPONS HOLD** and returns to it whenever the conditions below are not met. The only other state is **WEAPONS TIGHT**: fire at a contact held hostile, and at nothing else. **Weapons Free is never ordered.** Annex G.
3. (NR) **National fire authorisation.** To fire over **Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania**, COM BAD first asks that government. Allow about twenty minutes for the answer, more from a government under pressure. Once granted it lasts **six hours**; the capital warns twenty minutes before it runs out; a renewal may be asked in the last half hour and runs on from the end of the first. When it lapses every unit over that country is back on Hold. Annex H.
4. (NR) **Then COM BAD opens fire**, by his own order: Weapons Tight for a country's batteries, for the fighters, or unit by unit. An order to a country's batteries **stands**: they go back to Hold when the authorisation lapses and to Tight again when it is renewed. An order to the fighters stands likewise: Tight wherever fire is authorised, Hold everywhere else.
5. (NR) **Finland.** The Hornets and FI NASAMS HELSINKI may fire over Finland without asking. **No Italian, Turkish or Swedish fighter fires over Finland.**
6. (NR) **Never fire on a manned aircraft**, military or civil, whatever it does.
7. (NR) **The border. Nothing of ours crosses the Russian or Belarusian border: no aircraft, no missile.** Kaliningrad is Russia. **A drone still beyond the border is not a target**: it is held UNFRIENDLY, and becomes HOSTILE one to four minutes after it has crossed. An aircraft that strays across has **two minutes** to come back before it is an incident. Patrols near the line are flown with pursuit beyond the patrol area forbidden.
8. (NR) **No fire outside the four countries**: not over the open Baltic, not over Poland.
9. (NR) **Identification.** Under the E-3A, drones are identified from far away. Elsewhere a track often stays a BOGEY or an unidentified drone on the plot, and no unit on Tight will fire at it. Bring a fighter close, wait for a camera, or, **if COM BAD is sure of it, declare it hostile himself**. A track lost and found again is a new track and must be declared again. **Declare a manned aircraft hostile and it will be shot at.** Annex B paragraph 6.
10. (NR) **Where it falls.** Wreckage comes down close to where the drone is hit. Do not engage over a town or a sensitive site, or just short of one: hold, let it cross, and engage beyond. **Debris over a town is ours to answer for.**
11. (NR) **Which weapon.** A fighter on Tight fires its longest-range missile first at every hostile drone in reach unless told otherwise. Set its weapon rules, or choose the weapon. A missile fired at the edge of its range at a slow target is usually a missile lost. Annex D paragraph 5.
12. (NR) **Public alert.** Raised country by country in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on COM BAD's word, two hours at a time, Annex K. Finland decides its own.
13. (NR) **Russian aircraft** are met, shadowed and filmed on our side of the line. Annex F.
14. (NR) PIRs at Annex B paragraph 7, plotted at Appendix 1 to Annex B. Codewords and reports at Annex J. Every track, every shot and every authorisation is logged with its time: **the log is what the capitals will read**.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Missiles

(NR) **Missile stocks are limited and counted.** Each base holds what its aircraft carry and a small reserve in its magazine: about a night and a half at a sensible rate, and no resupply within the period. Gun ammunition is not rationed.

BASE	ON EACH AIRCRAFT	IN THE BASE MAGAZINE	OTHER STORES
SIAULIAI LUPO 1–4	Meteor ×4, IRIS-T ×2, gun	**Meteor ×8, IRIS-T ×8**	1,000-litre drop tanks ×12
AMARI PARS 1–5	AIM-120B ×4, AIM-9X ×2, gun	**AIM-120B ×8, AIM-9X ×8**	370-gallon drop tanks ×10
RISSALA ILVES 1–4	AIM-120C-7 ×2, AIM-9X ×2, gun, Litening pod	**AIM-120C-7 ×8, AIM-9X ×8**	330-gallon drop tanks ×12; Litening pods ×4

(NR) The ground-based units fight with the rounds on their launchers and their own first-line reloads; nothing more reaches them through this headquarters before 261600Z. **Every missile fired is reported and will be asked about**, in Rome, in Ankara and in Vilnius first of all: a Meteor or an AMRAAM on a foam decoy is a bad bargain, and the capitals know the prices.

b. Air-to-air refuelling

(NR) No tanker is on station. **One A330 MRTT (NATO MRTT 01) is available on request** from Eindhoven: on station over the Gulf of Riga (TANKER ORBIT, Annex C paragraph 4) two hours after the request, for eight hours, under COM BAD's orders. Requests are accepted until 261300Z. Without it, a fighter's time on patrol is what its own fuel allows; Rissala is about 25 minutes from the Gulf of Finland.

c. Reinforcements on request

(NR) AIRCOM's reserve for the night is small and has been drawn on all autumn. **It is counted in shares, and it does not cover everything below.** Each request is made twice: the first call returns the cost, the second commits it.

REQUEST	COST	WHAT COMES	LIMITS
E-3A RELIEF	2 shares	A second E-3A (NATO AEW 02) from Geilenkirchen takes the orbit at 260000Z; the orbit then stays manned to the end	**Asked before 252300Z**, or no crew can be there
E-3A MOVE	none	The E-3A changes orbit, south to north or back; about 40 minutes in transit	One move north and one back. The orbit it leaves loses its cover
TANKER	1 share	NATO MRTT 01, as paragraph 4b	Once. Not after 261300Z
FIGHTERS	2 shares	Two Swedish JAS 39C (GRIPEN 1 and 2) from Ronneby, with AMRAAM and IRIS-T, landing three hours after the request at Ämari or Šiauliai, whichever has fewer fighters	Once. Not after 261200Z. Their missiles come with them

d. Medical, search and rescue, and what falls

(NR) Aircrew rescue through the national rescue coordination centres of the four states. **Wreckage and unexploded warheads** are the business of national explosive ordnance disposal and police; report the position of every kill and every crash at once so that they can be cordoned.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command

(NR) COM BAD exercises tactical command of the Italian, Turkish and Finnish fighters and of any Swedish reinforcement, and tactical control of the national ground-based air defence and radars at Annex A. Operational command of each remains national. **The authority to fire over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania remains with each government** and is lent under Annex H; over Finland it is exercised by the Finnish units alone. Succession of command: COM BAD; the senior controller, CRC Karmėlava; CAOC Uedem.

(NR) **The E-3A is not under COM BAD's orders.** NATO AEW 01 belongs to the NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force and is tasked by this headquarters. It flies **AEW SOUTH**, over the Lithuanian–Polish border, and **leaves at 260000Z**. It shares everything it holds. COM BAD may ask for a relief and for a move of orbit, paragraph 4c; he cannot give it a course, a height or a task.

(NR) **The request for fire, the order to open fire and the advice to raise an alert are the commander's own acts.** Each is logged with its time and is not delegated.

b. Signal

(NR) Annex J. COM BAD reports to the CAOC Uedem operations floor on the command net, info AIRCOM; the three Baltic ministries and Helsinki through their liaison officers at the CRC.

(NR) **Track reports from the E-3A.** Once the E-3A has held a drone long enough to judge it, and the drone is inside our airspace, it reports that track **once**, with its position and its behaviour: slow and erratic, as a drone under jamming flies, or otherwise. **It reports only where it covers.** Read every one.

REPORT	WHEN	CONTENT
FIRE REQUEST	before it is needed	COM BAD to the capital concerned. The capital answers with a time, then with a decision and its hour of expiry
KILL / CRASH	at once	Track, position, what was underneath, who fired and with what. The capital concerned hears it from the CRC first
MORNING COUNT	260600Z	Taken by the three capitals from the night's log: what exploded on whose soil. **Each government decides that morning how far it still trusts this headquarters**
INCIDENT	FLASH	An aircraft of ours across the border; a shot outside the rules; a Russian aircraft inside allied airspace; any aircraft down
SITREP	every 4 hours	Tracks, kills, impacts, authorisations in force and their expiry, alerts, missiles fired and left

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

(NR) Acknowledge receipt of this order and of Annexes A to M by immediate signal, quoting serial CAOC-UE/OPS/BAD/26-058.

BRANDSTETTER, Ulrich
Lieutenant General, German Air Force
Commander, Combined Air Operations Centre Uedem
for Commander Allied Air Command

Authentication. VAN DER HEIDE, P. — Colonel, Royal Netherlands Air Force — A3 Operations, CAOC Uedem. Original signed copy held in the CAOC Uedem registry.

A

Task Organisation

ANNEX A TO OPORD 26-058 · DTG 250900ZNOV26 · CAOC-UE/OPS/BAD/26-058

1. FIGHTERS — UNDER TACTICAL COMMAND OF COM BAD

> State at H-hour, 251600Z: every aircraft armed and available on its base, nothing airborne, everything on Weapons Hold.

CALLSIGN	AIRCRAFT	BASE	WEAPONS CARRIED	REMARKS
LUPO 1, 2, 3, 4	Eurofighter F-2000A, Italian Air Force	SIAULIAI	Meteor ×4, IRIS-T ×2, gun	Air policing, Lithuania and Latvia. Infrared search and track: classifies a drone from far
PARS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5	F-16C Block 40, Turkish Air Force, 181st Squadron “Pars”	AMARI	AIM-120B ×4, AIM-9X ×2, gun	Air policing, Estonia. **No targeting pod**: closes to identify. Tour ends 30 NOV
ILVES 1, 2, 3, 4	F/A-18C Hornet, Finnish Air Force, Karelia Air Wing	RISSALA	AIM-120C-7 ×2, AIM-9X ×2, gun, Litening pod	**The only fighters allowed to fire over Finland.** About 25 minutes from the Gulf of Finland

2. AIR BASES

BASE	POSITION	COUNTRY	REMARKS
Šiauliai (SIAULIAI)	55°53.6'N 023°23.7'E	Lithuania	Italian detachment. Magazine at paragraph 4a of the order
Ämari (AMARI)	59°15.6'N 024°12.5'E	Estonia	Turkish detachment
Rissala (RISSALA), Kuopio	63°00.4'N 027°47.9'E	Finland	Karelia Air Wing

3. GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENCE — UNDER TACTICAL CONTROL OF COM BAD

> Sixteen units. Positions and employment at Annex D paragraph 3; drawn at Appendix 1 to Annex C.

COUNTRY	UNITS	COMPOSITION	FIRES ON
ESTONIA	5	EE IRIS-T IDA-VIRU (IRIS-T SLM, medium range) · EE MISTRAL NARVA · EE MISTRAL SILLAMAE · EE PIORUN AUVERE · EE PIORUN TARTU	Tallinn's authorisation
LATVIA	6	LV RBS 70 REZEKNE · LV RBS 70 DAUGAVPILS · LV RBS 70 RIGA · LV DRONE WALL NORTH, CENTRE and SOUTH (laser-guided rockets, infrared cameras). **No medium-range system**	Riga's authorisation
LITHUANIA	4	LT NASAMS VILNIUS · LT NASAMS KRUONIS (AMRAAM-ER) · LT RBS 70 VISAGINAS · LT RBS 70 SIAULIAI	Vilnius's authorisation
FINLAND	1	FI NASAMS HELSINKI	Standing Finnish authority

4. SURVEILLANCE RADARS

COUNTRY	RADARS	NAMES ON THE PLOT
ESTONIA	5	EE GIRAFFE JOHVI · EE GIRAFFE VORU · EE RADAR KELLAVERE · EE RADAR TOIKAMAE · EE RADAR MUHU
LATVIA	5	LV WALL SENSOR NORTH, CENTRE and SOUTH · LV RADAR AUDRINI · LV RADAR LIELVARDE
LITHUANIA	4	LT RADAR ANTAVERSIS · LT RADAR DEGUCIAI · LT SENTINEL VILNIUS · LT SENTINEL KRUONIS
FINLAND	1	FI RADAR VIROLAHTI

5. NATO AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING — IN SUPPORT, NOT UNDER COMMAND

CALLSIGN	AIRCRAFT	ORBIT	REMARKS
NATO AEW 01	E-3A Sentry, NATO AEW&C Force	AEW SOUTH	On station at 54°18.0'N 023°36.0'E, 9,000 m, radar active. **Leaves at 260000Z.** Shares its picture; takes no order from COM BAD
NATO AEW 02	E-3A Sentry, relief	as AEW 01	**Only if asked before 252300Z.** Arrives from Geilenkirchen and takes the orbit at 260000Z

6. REINFORCEMENTS ON REQUEST — AIRCOM RESERVE

CALLSIGN	UNIT	COMES FROM	REMARKS
NATO MRTT 01	Airbus A330 MRTT, Multinational MRTT Fleet	Eindhoven	TANKER ORBIT over the Gulf of Riga, two hours after the request, for eight hours. Under COM BAD's orders while on station
GRIPEN 1, 2	JAS 39C Gripen, Swedish Air Force, Blekinge Wing F 17	Ronneby	AMRAAM and IRIS-T. Land three hours after the request at Ämari or Šiauliai, whichever has fewer fighters. **Same fire rules as the other fighters; never over Finland**

> Costs, limits and closing times at paragraph 4c of the order. The reserve does not cover a relief E-3A, a tanker and two fighters together.

7. NOT AVAILABLE FOR THIS OPERATION

(NR) **No Latvian medium-range system**: the Latvian IRIS-T is ordered and not delivered. **No second E-3A on station** without drawing on the reserve. **No tanker on station** at H-hour. **No ship**: no air-defence frigate is assigned to the Gulf of Finland or the Gulf of Riga. **No further missiles** before 261600Z. **No counter-drone interceptors** beyond the Latvian wall: the systems ordered by the Baltic states this autumn are not yet in service. These requests are recorded so that the commander knows they were made.

8. AGENCIES — FOR COORDINATION ONLY

AGENCY	REMARKS
Governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (TALLINN, RIGA, VILNIUS)	Grant, renew and withdraw the fire authorisation; raise the public alert. Annexes H and K
Government of Finland (HELSINKI)	Standing authority for the Finnish units. Raises its own alerts
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian air operations centres	National batteries and radars; national recognised air picture
Lithuanian Border Guard, Estonian Air Force watch	What is heard and seen on the border; Russian aircraft starting up. Annex B paragraph 9
VSD (Lithuania) and SAB (Latvia), state security	Examination of wreckage; what a drone was and where it was going
Civil aviation authorities and airport operators	NOTAM, airport closures under alert. Annex E

9. NATIONAL NOTES

NATION	NOTE
EST LVA LTU	The right to fire in national airspace is the government's and is lent, not given. Each may take it back
FIN	Finnish units fire over Finland on Finnish authority. **No foreign fighter fires over Finland.** Finnish Hornets over a Baltic state follow that state's rule
ITA	Rome will ask how many missiles its detachment has left, and what they were fired at
TUR	The detachment goes home on 30 November. Ankara will ask what its F-16s fired at
SWE	The Gripens, if sent, are under COM BAD for the period and follow the same card

B

Intelligence

ANNEX B TO OPORD 26-058 · DTG 250900ZNOV26 · ORIGINATOR CAOC UEDEM A2 WITH THE BALTIC AND FINNISH AIR STAFFS

SOURCE GRADING

Reports are graded on the standard scale: source reliability **A** reliable to **F** cannot be judged; information credibility **1** confirmed to **6** cannot be judged. A2 reliable, probably true; B2 usually reliable, probably true; B3 usually reliable, possibly true; C2 fairly reliable, probably true. **A graded report can be wrong, and a report that a thing was not seen is not proof that it is absent.** Matters of public record are marked A1.

1. SUMMARY

(NR) **The public record** A1. Since March 2026, Ukrainian drones thrown off course during strikes on Ust-Luga and Primorsk have come down in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland: the chimney of the Auvere power plant was hit; a drone of the AN-196 type fell near Kouvola and its warhead was destroyed where it lay. On 7 May a drone exploded on the Rēzekne fuel depot; the Latvian defence minister resigned and the government fell. On 15 May an alert kept the Helsinki region indoors and closed the airport for three hours. On 19 May a drone was shot down over Estonia for the first time, by an air-policing fighter; on 8 June and 14 August two more over Latvia. **On 15 September a Russian Gerbera, come from Belarus, was shot down near the Kruonis pumped-storage plant**, half an hour after it crossed; the Lithuanian President said it had been bound for Ukraine, and called a fighter “not an efficient solution”. Latvia has since built a drone wall along its eastern border.

(NR) **Now.** Kyiv has announced a strike on the two oil ports tonight. Russia is preparing a wave of its own through Belarus B2. Talks on an energy truce were held in September; **no truce is in force**. Both flows are therefore expected within the same twenty-four hours, with Russian aircraft on the line by day.

(NR) **This cell does not rank the axes**, nor say how many drones will cross or when. The evidence to do so does not exist. What follows says what each thing looks like, and who can tell.

2. THE TWO DRONES

	UKRAINIAN LONG-RANGE STRIKE DRONE	RUSSIAN GERBERA
WHAT	A strike drone built to reach Russian oil ports, of the AN-196 type and others like it	A cheap foam copy of the Russian strike drone, launched in numbers to saturate Ukrainian air defence
WARHEAD	**As a rule, yes.** A few have been found without one	**As a rule, no:** a decoy. **Some are armed**, and nothing shows which
FLIGHT	Piston engine, about 80 kt, about 300 m	Piston engine, about 80 kt, about 300 m
COMES FROM	Russia: Leningrad and Pskov regions	Belarus
INTO	Estonia, Latvia, Finland	Lithuania, south-east Latvia
ON RADAR	**The same.** Small, slow, low. The E-3A can tell them apart at range; the Gerbera more reliably than the Ukrainian type	

3. HOW A DRONE UNDER JAMMING FLIES

1. **It no longer knows where it is.** Its navigation is jammed or deceived. It flies on, at the same speed and height, towards a place that is not its target.
2. **It wanders.** Legs of some minutes, turns of several tens of degrees, to one side and then the other. Its course at any moment says little about where it will be in half an hour.
3. **Many leave again**, back across the line or out to sea. **Many come down when the fuel runs out**, in fields, forest or water. **Some come down on a town or a site**, by chance.
4. **With a warhead it explodes where it lands.** Without one it is wreckage, and still falls on whatever is underneath.
5. **Shot down, it falls close to where it was hit**, warhead and all. A kill over a town puts the wreckage on the town.

4. RUSSIAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT AND THE RUSSIAN POSTURE

(NR) **Fighters.** Su-30s of the Russian Aerospace Forces and naval aviation fly the international corridor of the Gulf of Finland, often with transponders off, no flight plan and no radio contact. At **Vaindloo** the corridor is narrow and the Estonian line bends; in March one cut the corner for about a minute [A1]. What the next pilots have been told to do there cannot be known in advance. Estonian watchers report when Russian fighters start up east of Narva [B2]: some minutes' warning, no more.

(NR) **Helicopters.** A Mi-8 from Kaliningrad may follow the Nemunas and stray over Lithuanian soil near **Jurbarkas**, as one did over Poland in September [B3]. It is low and slow; the Border Guard will hear it before a radar sees it.

(NR) **What they are for.** To be seen unanswered, or to be answered wrongly. **A Russian aircraft inside our airspace that is met by a fighter and filmed is a Russian embarrassment; one that nobody met is ours; one that is shot down is a catastrophe.** Russian weapons are assessed held [B2].

5. READING A TRACK — WHAT WOULD SHOW WHAT

WHAT IS SEEN	WHAT IT SUGGESTS	WHAT IT DOES NOT PROVE
CROSSED FROM RUSSIA	A Ukrainian stray: probably armed	That it is armed, or that it is Ukrainian
CROSSED FROM BELARUS	A Gerbera: probably empty	That it is empty
SLOW, ERRATIC COURSE	A drone under jamming, lost	That it will not end on a town
FAST, HIGH, 400 KT OR MORE	An aircraft with people in it: an airliner, or a Russian fighter	— **never a target**
LOW, 100 KT, ON THE KALININGRAD BORDER	A helicopter	— **never a target**

(NR) The E-3A's track reports (paragraph 5b of the order) describe how each track it holds is flying. They are read with the rest of the picture.

6. WHO CAN IDENTIFY WHAT

> A unit on Weapons Tight fires only at a contact held HOSTILE. A contact becomes hostile when a sensor identifies it as a drone inside our airspace, or when COM BAD declares it. Everything below follows from that.

SENSOR	DETECTS A DRONE	IDENTIFIES IT	LIMITS
E-3A (NATO AEW)	At long range, well beyond the line	**Yes, at range**: the Gerbera reliably, the Ukrainian type later and less regularly	Only where it orbits. **From AEW SOUTH it covers Lithuania and the south of Latvia, not Estonia.** Off station at 260000Z unless relieved
Surveillance radars (AN/TPS-77, Ground Master, Giraffe, Sentinel)	At some tens of miles; less for the small Giraffe	**No**	The track stays an unknown on the plot
Drone-wall cameras (Latvia)	—	Classify a drone at medium range; **identify at short range**	On the border only; little time before the drone is past
Mistral and Piorun posts	—	By eye, inside two miles	Too late to choose where it falls
Eurofighter	Infrared sensor classifies a drone from far	Closes to identify	Fuel, and the line
F-16, Hornet	Radar, at short range against so small a target	Closes to identify; the Hornet has a pod	Fuel, and the line

(NR) **Consequence.** Where the E-3A covers, batteries on Weapons Tight are enough. Elsewhere a track stays unidentified: bring a fighter to it, wait for a camera, or declare it. **Between the crossing and the moment a track is held hostile, one to four minutes pass**: a drone is one to five miles inside before anything on Tight will engage it, and the batteries on the line itself have little time.

7. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

> A PIR is a question the commander needs answered in order to decide something. Report answers immediately and directly. Do not wait to complete a picture.

PIR	QUESTION	DECISION IT INFORMS	NAI
PIR 1	Which tracks are approaching the line, on which axes, and which have crossed?	Which government to ask, and when; where the fighters go	01–07
PIR 2	What is each track, and what lies ahead of it: open country, a town, a site?	Fire now, hold, or wait; which weapon; an alert	01–07
PIR 3	How is each track flying, as the E-3A reports it, and where is it heading?	What is engaged first	01–07
PIR 4	Are Russian aircraft starting up, airborne near Vaindloo, or on the Kaliningrad border?	When a fighter is sent to meet them	08, 09
PIR 5	What came down, where, and was it armed?	What the capital is told; whether the next authorisation is given	all
PIR 6	Is another wave forming over Belarus towards dusk on the 26th?	Authorisations and alerts before dark; missiles kept back	05–07

8. NAMED AREAS OF INTEREST

> Axes are where the staff expects tracks, from the incidents of 2026. The crossing points are approximate.

NAI	DESCRIPTION	CROSSING, ABOUT	LEADS TO	COLLECTOR
NAI 01	NARVA axis. Ukrainian strays	59°18.0'N 028°10.8'E	Ida-Virumaa and the Auvere power plants	IRIS-T radar, GIRAFFE JOHVI, PARS
NAI 02	LAKE PEIPUS axis. Ukrainian strays	58°24.0'N 027°31.8'E	Tartu and south-east Estonia	TOIKAMAE, GIRAFFE VORU, PARS
NAI 03	LATGALE axis. Ukrainian strays	56°54.0'N 027°49.8'E	Rēzekne, its fuel depot and northern Latgale	Drone wall, AUDRINI, LUPO
NAI 04	GULF OF FINLAND axis. Ukrainian strays	60°12.0'N 027°52.8'E	The Finnish coast from Kotka to Loviisa and Porvoo	VIROLAHTI, ILVES
NAI 05	VILNIUS axis. Gerberas	54°45.0'N 025°45.0'E	Vilnius, its airport and the border districts	E-3A, SENTINEL VILNIUS, LUPO
NAI 06	KAIŠIADORYS axis. Gerberas	54°28.2'N 025°43.2'E	Kaišiadorys and Kaunas; the Kruonis and Elektrėnai plants	E-3A, SENTINEL KRUONIS, ANTAVERSIS
NAI 07	DAUGAVPILS axis. Gerberas	55°44.4'N 026°49.2'E	Daugavpils, Visaginas and southern Latgale	DEGUCIAI, drone wall south, LUPO
NAI 08	VAINDLOO. Russian fighters in the Gulf corridor, by day	12 nm round 59°49.2'N 026°21.6'E	Estonian airspace north of Rakvere	KELLAVERE, PARS, ILVES
NAI 09	NEMUNAS. A helicopter from Kaliningrad, by day	10 nm round 55°03.6'N 022°33.0'E	Lithuanian soil west of Jurbarkas	Border Guard, LUPO


9. COLLECTION PLAN

SOURCE	WHAT IT CAN GIVE	LIMITS
E-3A (NATO AEW)	Tracks beyond the line; identification; **a report on each track's behaviour**	Where it orbits; until 260000Z unless relieved
National radars, wall cameras, missile posts, fighters	Paragraph 6	Paragraph 6
Kyiv and open sources	The announcement that a Ukrainian wave has been launched	Minutes of warning, no numbers
Lithuanian Border Guard	Piston engines heard over Belarus before a wave; helicopter activity in Kaliningrad	Ears, not radar B2
Estonian Air Force watch	Russian fighters starting up east of Narva	Says that they fly, not what they intend B2
VSD and SAB	What a wreck was, what it carried, where its route ended	After the event C2 before it


10. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

- How many drones, on which axes, at what hour. **Nobody knows, including those who launched them.**
- Which drones are armed. Not knowable before they come down.
- What the Russian pilots have been told to do at Vaindloo.
- Whether a second Russian wave follows at dusk on the 26th.


ANNEX B TO OPORD 26-058 — PAGE B-4 OF B-4



INSET 1 · NAI 08 · VAINDLOO
RUSSIAN FIGHTERS IN THE GULF CORRIDOR · PRECEDENT MARCH 2026 · A1



INSET 2 · NAI 09 · NEMUNAS AT JURBARKAS
A HELICOPTER FROM KALININGRAD · PRECEDENT SEPT 2026, POLAND · A1



WHO CAN IDENTIFY WHAT · ANNEX B PARA 6
E-3A (NATO AEW) · DETECTS AND IDENTIFIES AT LONG RANGE; THE GERBERA MORE RELIABLY THAN THE UKRAINIAN TYPE. REPORTS EACH TRACK'S BEHAVIOUR: ERRATIC OR STEADY. ONLY WHERE IT COVERS GROUND RADARS · DETECT A SLOW LOW TARGET AT SOME TENS OF MILES; DO NOT IDENTIFY IT
DRONE-WALL CAMERAS (LATVIA) · CLASSIFY, THEN IDENTIFY, AT SHORT RANGE
MISTRAL AND PIORUN POSTS · BY EYE, INSIDE TWO MILES
FIGHTERS · MUST CLOSE TO IDENTIFY; THE EUROFIGHTER'S INFRARED SENSOR CLASSIFIES A DRONE FROM FAR
NOBODY · CAN TELL A WARHEAD FROM A DECOY BEFORE IT COMES DOWN

READING A TRACK · ANNEX B PARA 5
A DRONE UNDER JAMMING WANDERS: SHORT LEGS, TURNS OF TENS OF DEGREES, NO PLACE IT IS GOING. MANY LEAVE AGAIN OR COME DOWN IN OPEN COUNTRY; SOME COME DOWN ON A TOWN. A TRACK THAT HOLDS ONE COURSE AT ONE SPEED IS NOT BEHAVING LIKE A LOST DRONE: REPORT IT.

THE TWO FLOWS LOOK ALIKE ON RADAR
BOTH TYPES: PISTON ENGINE, ABOUT 80 KT, ABOUT 300 M, SMALL. UKRAINIAN STRAYS ENTER ESTONIA, LATVIA AND FINLAND FROM RUSSIA. GERBERAS ENTER LITHUANIA AND SOUTH-EAST LATVIA FROM BELARUS. WHERE IT CROSSED IS THE FIRST CLUE TO WHAT IT IS, NOT A PROOF.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B

CHARTS	ICAO 1:1 000 000 · WGS 84
SCALE	APPROX 1:6 500 000 · INSETS LARGER
DATUM	WGS 84 · DEG AND DEC MIN
DTG	250900ZNOV26
ORIGINATOR	CAOC UEDEM / A2
SHEET	1 OF 1

INTELLIGENCE OVERLAY

THE TWO DRONE FLOWS, JAMMING AND RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT, AS ASSESSED
THE SEVEN AXES ARE DRAWN ALIKE: NONE IS ASSESSED MORE LIKELY

- RUSSIAN AND BELARUSIAN BORDERS, AS PLOTTED
- UKRAINIAN STRIKE: ASSESSED ROUTE (NOT A TRACK)
- RUSSIAN WAVE: ASSESSED ROUTE (NOT A TRACK)
- ASSESSED ENTRY AXIS: UKRAINIAN STRAYS
- ASSESSED ENTRY AXIS: GERBERAS
- GNSS DEGRADED (NOTAM EXPECTED TONIGHT)
- JAMMER, ASSESSED LOCATION
- RUSSIAN MANNED AIRCRAFT: PRECEDENT TRACK
- NAI FOR MANNED AIRCRAFT
- E-3A ORBIT (AEW SOUTH)
- OWN SURVEILLANCE RADAR
- SENSITIVE SITE (NAMED ON APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C)

NAMED AREAS OF INTEREST · ANNEX B PARA 8 · PIR AT PARA 7

NAI 01	NARVA AXIS, INTO IDA-VIRUMAA PIR 1 2 3 · IRIS-T RADAR, GIRAFFE JOHVI, PARS
NAI 02	LAKE PEIPUS AXIS, TO TARTU AND VORU PIR 1 2 3 · TOIKAMAE, GIRAFFE VORU, PARS
NAI 03	LATGALE AXIS, TO REZEKNE PIR 1 2 3 · DRONE WALL, AUDRINI, LUPO
NAI 04	GULF OF FINLAND AXIS, TO KOTKA AND LOVIISA PIR 1 2 3 · VIROLAHTI, ILVES
NAI 05	VILNIUS AXIS PIR 1 2 3 · E-3A, SENTINEL VILNIUS, LUPO
NAI 06	KAISIADORYS AXIS, TO KRUONIS AND KAUNAS PIR 1 2 3 · E-3A, SENTINEL KRUONIS, ANTAVERSIS
NAI 07	DAUGAVPILS AXIS, TO VISAGINAS AND LATGALE PIR 1 2 3 · DEGUCIAI, DRONE WALL SOUTH, LUPO
NAI 08	VAINDLOO, GULF OF FINLAND PIR 4 · KELLAVERE, PARS, ILVES · BY DAY
NAI 09	NEMUNAS AT JURBARKAS PIR 4 · BORDER GUARD, LUPO · BY DAY

APP-6 FRAME = AFFILIATION

FRIENDLY · RUSSIAN · UNKNOWN / ASSESSED

MAIN MAP SCALE

0 — 50 — 100 NAUTICAL MILES

GRADING · SOURCE A–F, INFORMATION 1–6 · ANNEX B
NOTHING HERE IS AN OBSERVATION. ROUTES AND AXES ARE WHERE THE STAFF EXPECTS TRACKS, FROM THE INCIDENTS OF 2026. A DRONE UNDER JAMMING GOES WHERE THE JAMMING SENDS IT.

COASTLINE, LAKES AND STATE BORDERS NATURAL EARTH 1:10M, FOR ORIENTATION ONLY · LAY ON THE CHART AND REGISTER ON THE MARKS · GRATICULE 1° · DISTANCES IN NAUTICAL MILES

C

Operations

ANNEX C TO OPORD 26-058 · DTG 250900ZNOV26 · ORIGINATOR CAOC UEDEM / A3

1. PHASING

PHASE	FROM	AIM	ENDS WHEN
1 SET	251600Z	Picture read; governments asked in time; E-3A orbit and relief decided; fighters placed where the batteries are thin	The first track nears the line
2 NIGHT · THE WAVES	first track	Tracks identified; engaged over open country under authorisation, with the cheapest weapon that reaches; fire held over towns; alerts raised in time; authorisations renewed	260600Z, the morning count
3 DAY · THE LINE	260600Z	Rearmed; missiles counted; Russian aircraft met at Vaindloo and on the Kaliningrad border; late drones dealt with	Sunset, about 261350Z
4 DUSK	sunset	Ready for another wave from Belarus: authorisations in force before dark, missiles kept for it	261600Z
CONTINUOUS	251600Z	No fire without authorisation; nothing across the line; no manned aircraft engaged; missiles counted	261600Z

2. DECISION POINTS

DP	TRIGGER	DECISION	INFORMATION REQUIRED
DP 1 ASK	Kyiv's announcement; engines heard over Belarus; a track nearing a border	Which governments to ask, now. **The answer takes time**	PIR 1. Which axes are alive
DP 2 OPEN	Authorisation granted; a hostile track inside	Weapons Tight: for which batteries, which fighters. A standing order, or unit by unit	PIR 2. What lies under the track
DP 3 HOLD	A hostile track about to cross a town or a site	Back to Hold for the units in reach, until it is past	PIR 2. Its course in the next minutes
DP 4 DECLARE	A track inside that nothing has identified	Send a fighter to it, wait for a camera, or declare it hostile. **Is it certainly a drone?**	Speed, height, where it crossed
DP 5 ALERT	A track whose course threatens people	Advise that country's public alert, or not yet	PIR 2, 3. Annex K
DP 6 E-3A	By 252300Z; and whenever the north is blind	Ask for the relief? Move the orbit north, and when back?	Where the tracks are. The reserve
DP 7 RENEW	A capital's warning, twenty minutes before expiry	Ask again in the last half hour, or let it lapse	PIR 1, 6. Is anything still coming?
DP 8 RESERVE	Fuel or numbers short; by 261200Z and 261300Z	Gripens, tanker, or neither. **Not both and the relief**	Missiles and fighters left; the day ahead
DP 9 VISITOR	Warning of Russian aircraft starting up	Who goes to meet them, from where, and back by which way	PIR 4. Annex F

3. PATROLS

(NR) **No combat air patrol is laid down.** COM BAD builds his own: where, how many, for how long. A patrol is drawn well inside the NO-CROSS LINE and flown with pursuit and investigation beyond its area **forbidden**, or its aircraft will go to look at tracks on the other side. Thirteen fighters on three bases cannot watch seven axes all night: **put them where no battery reaches and no E-3A sees**, and keep some on the ground for the day.

4. CONTROL MEASURES

DESIGNATOR	TYPE	GEOMETRY	REMARKS
NO-CROSS LINE	Restrictive line	The Russian and Belarusian borders, as below	**No aircraft and no missile of ours beyond it.** A drone beyond it is not a target. Two minutes to come back
KALININGRAD	Restricted area	54°18'–55°18'N 019°36'–022°51'E less Lithuanian territory	Russia. Treated exactly as beyond the line
SECTOR EE	Fire-authority sector	Appendix 1	Estonia with its territorial sea. Tallinn authorises
SECTOR LV	Fire-authority sector	Appendix 1	Latvia with the Gulf of Riga. Riga authorises
SECTOR LT	Fire-authority sector	Appendix 1	Lithuania with its territorial sea. Vilnius authorises
SECTOR FI	Fire-authority sector	Appendix 1	Southern Finland and its waters. Finnish units only
AEW SOUTH	E-3A orbit	54°09'–54°27'N 023°00'–024°12'E	The Lithuanian–Polish border. NATO AEW 01 at H-hour
AEW NORTH	E-3A orbit	57°15'–57°33'N 025°24'–026°36'E	Northern Latvia and southern Estonia. On request, paragraph 5
TANKER ORBIT	Refuelling orbit	56°54'–57°12'N 023°00'–023°48'E	The Gulf of Riga. NATO MRTT 01, if asked for
VAINDLOO	Reference point	59°49.2'N 026°21.6'E	Estonian island in the Gulf of Finland. Annex F
JURBARKAS	Reference point	55°04.8'N 022°46.2'E	On the Nemunas, by the Kaliningrad border. Annex F
UST-LUGA	Reference point	59°40.8'N 028°24.0'E	Russian oil port. Beyond the line
PRIMORSK	Reference point	60°21.6'N 028°36.6'E	Russian oil port. Beyond the line
Sensitive sites	Reference points	fourteen, highlighted	Annex D paragraph 2

(NR) **The NO-CROSS LINE as plotted at the CRC**, north to south, straight between points:

62°54.0'N 031°36.0'E · 61°06.0'N 028°48.0'E · 60°33.0'N 027°48.0'E · 59°39.0'N 028°00.0'E · 59°21.0'N 028°15.0'E · 59°00.0'N 027°45.0'E · 58°30.0'N 027°30.0'E · 58°00.0'N 027°39.0'E · 57°51.0'N 027°48.0'E · 57°31.2'N 027°21.0'E · 57°00.0'N 027°45.0'E · 56°30.0'N 028°09.0'E · 56°10.2'N 028°09.0'E · 55°40.8'N 026°37.8'E · 55°18.0'N 026°48.0'E · 54°57.0'N 026°12.0'E · 54°48.0'N 025°45.0'E · 54°18.0'N 025°42.0'E · 54°09.0'N 025°33.0'E · 53°55.2'N 024°12.0'E · 53°00.0'N 023°54.0'E

(NR) It is the CRC's plot of the border, not the border to the metre. **Keep every patrol well inside it.** In the eastern Gulf of Finland the water between the Estonian and Finnish sectors is nobody's to fire in: no shot there.

5. THE E-3A AND ITS ORBITS

(NR) NATO AEW 01 flies AEW SOUTH at 9,000 metres from H-hour. From there it sees and identifies what comes out of Belarus into Lithuania and the south of Latvia; **it does not cover Estonia or the Gulf of Finland**. On COM BAD's request it moves to AEW NORTH, from which it covers Latvia and Estonia and **no longer covers the south**. The move takes about forty minutes, during which neither is well covered. **One move north and one move back, no more**; when AIRCOM has nothing to spare the move is delayed. At 260000Z it goes home; a relief, if asked for before 252300Z, takes whichever orbit it was on and keeps it to the end.

(NR) **Where the E-3A is decides where the batteries can fight alone.** It is the first decision of the evening and the one that cannot be taken twice.

6. OPENING AND HOLDING FIRE

ORDER	EFFECT	REMARKS
AIR DEFENCE TIGHT, by country	Every battery of that country fires at every contact held hostile within reach	Needs the authorisation (not for Finland). **Stands**: Hold at expiry, Tight again on renewal. Given before the authorisation, it is noted and takes effect when the authorisation is granted
AIR DEFENCE HOLD, by country	Every battery of that country ceases fire	Cancels the standing order. For instance while a drone crosses a town
FIGHTERS TIGHT	Each fighter is Tight when it enters a country where fire is authorised (Hornets over Finland too) and Hold everywhere else	Stands until cancelled. One aircraft can still be put on Hold by hand
FIGHTERS HOLD	Every fighter ceases fire and stays so	Cancels the standing order
By unit	One battery or one aircraft to Tight or Hold	Where fire is not authorised the unit is put back on Hold within a minute or two. **A shot in that minute is a shot outside the rules**

7. BY DAY

(NR) From first light keep fighters able to reach **Vaindloo** and the **Nemunas at Jurbarkas** within the warning time, Annex F. A fighter that goes to meet a Russian aircraft comes back on our side of the line: the pair at Vaindloo goes home eastwards, and Jurbarkas lies against Kaliningrad.


8. REARMING AND THE MORNING

(NR) All aircraft are available from H-hour; none is held in reserve by this order. An aircraft that lands rearms from the base magazine, paragraph 4a of the order, while it lasts. **At 260600Z count what is left**, on the aircraft, in the magazines and on the launchers, before deciding what the day and the dusk can be given.


9. DUSK

(NR) Sunset is at about 261350Z; the operation ends at 261600Z. If the Border Guard hears engines over Belarus again, a wave will be crossing in the last hours. **An authorisation asked at the first track is twenty minutes late**: have Vilnius's and Riga's in force before dark if there is any sign of it.


ANNEX C TO OPORD 26-058 — PAGE C-3 OF C-3




INSET 1 · IDA-VIRUMAA · THE NARVA AXIS
ESTONIA · FOUR UNITS AND A RADAR · NARVA LIES ON THE LINE



INSET 2 · LATGALE · REZEKNE
LATVIA · NO MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEM · THE DRONE WALL ON THE BORDER



INSET 3 · VILNIUS — KAUNAS
LITHUANIA · TWO NASAMS, THREE SITES, THE CAPITAL 15 NM FROM BELARUS



WHO MAY FIRE WHERE · ANNEX G
SECTOR EE, LV, LT · ANY UNIT, ONLY WHILE THAT GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORISATION HOLDS (SIX HOURS, ON REQUEST, RENEWABLE)
SECTOR FI · ILVES AND FI NASAMS HELSINKI ONLY; NO REQUEST NEEDED; LUPO, PARS AND GRIPEN NEVER FIRE THERE
OUTSIDE THE SECTORS (OPEN SEA, POLAND) · NO FIRE
BEYOND THE NO-CROSS LINE, KALININGRAD INCLUDED · NOTHING OF OURS: NO AIRCRAFT, NO MISSILE; A DRONE THERE IS NOT A TARGET A MANNED AIRCRAFT · NEVER

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C

CHARTS	ICAO 1:1 000 000 · WGS 84
SCALE	APPROX 1:6 500 000 · INSETS LARGER
DATUM	WGS 84 · DEG AND DEC MIN
DTG	250900ZNOV26
ORIGINATOR	CAOC UEDEM / A3
SHEET	1 OF 1

OPERATIONS OVERLAY

OPORD 26-058 · OPERATION STRAY LIGHTS · 25–26 NOV 26
POSITIONS AT 251600Z · NOTHING AIRBORNE · ALL ON WEAPONS HOLD

- NO-CROSS LINE: RUSSIAN AND BELARUSIAN BORDERS
- KALININGRAD: BEYOND THE BORDER
- NATIONAL SECTOR (FIRE AUTHORITY), AS PLOTTED AT THE CRC
- ORBIT: E-3A (NATO AEW) OR TANKER
- TRANSIT
- STATE BORDER (ORIENTATION)
- INSET FRAME
- AIR BASE AND FIGHTER DETACHMENT
- GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENCE UNIT (16)
- SURVEILLANCE RADAR (15): DETECTS, DOES NOT IDENTIFY
- SENSITIVE SITE (14)
- TOWN
- REFERENCE POINT

GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENCE BY COUNTRY · ANNEX D

EE	5	IRIS-T SLM IDA-VIRU · MISTRAL NARVA, SILLAMAE PIORUN AUVERE, TARTU
LV	6	RBS 70 REZEKNE, DAUGAVPILS, RIGA DRONE WALL NORTH, CENTRE, SOUTH · NO MEDIUM RANGE
LT	4	NASAMS VILNIUS, KRUONIS RBS 70 VISAGINAS, SIAULIAI
FI	1	NASAMS HELSINKI NEEDS NO AUTHORISATION

FIGHTERS

LUPO 1–4	SIAULIAI	EUROFIGHTER · METEOR, IRIS-T
PARS 1–5	AMARI	F-16 · AIM-120B, AIM-9X
ILVES 1–4	RISSALA	F/A-18C · AIM-120C-7, AIM-9X
GRIPEN 1–2	ON REQUEST	JAS 39C · AMRAAM, IRIS-T

ORBITS

AEW SOUTH	54°09'–54°27'N 023°00'–024°12'E
AEW NORTH	57°15'–57°33'N 025°24'–026°36'E
TANKER ORBIT	56°54'–57°12'N 023°00'–023°48'E

MAIN MAP SCALE

0 — 50 — 100 NAUTICAL MILES

THE SECTORS ARE THOSE PLOTTED AT CRC KARMELAVA: STRAIGHT LINES, TERRITORIAL SEA AND GULF WATERS INCLUDED. THEY DECIDE WHOSE AUTHORISATION A SHOT NEEDS. THE NO-CROSS LINE IS THE CRC'S PLOT OF THE BORDER, STRAIGHT BETWEEN POINTS, NOT THE BORDER TO THE METRE: KEEP EVERY PATROL WELL INSIDE IT.

COASTLINE, LAKES AND STATE BORDERS NATURAL EARTH 1:10M, FOR ORIENTATION ONLY · LAY ON THE CHART AND REGISTER ON THE MARKS · GRATICULE 1° · DISTANCES IN NAUTICAL MILES

D

Air defence plan

ANNEX D TO OPORD 26-058 · WITH THE ESTONIAN, LATVIAN, LITHUANIAN AND FINNISH AIR STAFFS · VALID 251600Z TO 261600Z

1. PRINCIPLE

(NR) The batteries are where their governments put them and do not move in the period. They are few, mostly short-range, and sited on what each country fears for most. **Between them are wide gaps that only a fighter can fill.** The plan is not to shoot down everything: it is to keep warheads off towns and sites, and to bring drones down where the wreckage harms nobody.

2. SENSITIVE SITES — HIGHLIGHTED ON THE PLOT

SITE	POSITION	COUNTRY	WHAT IT IS	NEAREST DEFENCE
AUVERE POWER PLANTS	59°16.2'N 027°54.0'E	EE	The Auvere and Eesti power plants; hit in March	PIORUN AUVERE, MISTRAL NARVA, IRIS-T
TALLINN AIRPORT	59°24.8'N 024°50.0'E	EE	The capital's airport	None; PARS from Ämari
MUUGA PORT	59°30.0'N 024°57.6'E	EE	Estonia's main cargo and fuel port	None; PARS from Ämari
REZEKNE FUEL DEPOT	56°30.0'N 027°19.8'E	LV	Hit on 7 May. **Riga will not survive a second time**	RBS 70 REZEKNE, the wall
INCUKALNS GAS STORAGE	57°06.0'N 024°41.4'E	LV	The region's underground gas store	None near; RBS 70 RIGA is 25 nm away
RIGA AIRPORT	56°55.2'N 023°58.2'E	LV	The busiest airport of the three states	RBS 70 RIGA
KRUONIS PUMPED STORAGE	54°48.0'N 024°15.0'E	LT	Pumped-storage plant; the Gerbera of 15 September fell nearby	NASAMS KRUONIS
ELEKTRENAI POWER PLANT	54°46.2'N 024°39.0'E	LT	Lithuania's main thermal power plant	NASAMS KRUONIS
VILNIUS AIRPORT	54°38.0'N 025°17.2'E	LT	The capital's airport, 15 nm from Belarus	NASAMS VILNIUS
VISAGINAS (IGNALINA)	55°36.0'N 026°33.6'E	LT	The closed Ignalina nuclear plant and its fuel store, 9 nm from the line	RBS 70 VISAGINAS
KLAIPEDA LNG	55°39.6'N 021°08.4'E	LT	The LNG terminal, on the coast	None; LUPO from Šiauliai
LOVIISA NPP	60°22.2'N 026°21.0'E	FI	Nuclear power plant, working	None near; ILVES
KOTKA PORT	60°28.2'N 026°57.0'E	FI	Port, 25 nm from the line	None; ILVES
HELSINKI-VANTAA	60°19.2'N 024°57.6'E	FI	Finland's main airport	NASAMS HELSINKI

> A kill close to a site puts the wreckage on the site. Engage well before it, or after.

3. GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENCE UNITS

UNIT	SYSTEM	POSITION	COVERS
EE IRIS-T IDA-VIRU	IRIS-T SLM platoon, **medium range**, own radar	59°19.8'N 027°27.0'E	The Narva axis, from Jõhvi. Record of Changes serial 03
EE MISTRAL NARVA	Mistral 3, three posts	59°22.2'N 027°58.8'E	Between Narva and Sillamäe, 6 nm from Narva. Paragraph 7
EE MISTRAL SILLAMAE	Mistral 3, three posts	59°23.4'N 027°44.4'E	Sillamäe
EE PIORUN AUVERE	Piorun, three posts	59°16.8'N 027°52.8'E	The Auvere power plants
EE PIORUN TARTU	Piorun, three posts	58°22.2'N 026°44.4'E	Tartu
LV RBS 70 REZEKNE	RBS 70 NG platoon	56°30.0'N 027°21.6'E	Rēzekne and the fuel depot
LV RBS 70 DAUGAVPILS	RBS 70 NG platoon	55°52.8'N 026°32.4'E	Daugavpils
LV RBS 70 RIGA	RBS 70 NG platoon	56°55.8'N 024°00.0'E	Riga and its airport
LV DRONE WALL NORTH	Counter-drone unit: laser-guided rockets, infrared camera	57°06.0'N 027°36.0'E	The border north of Rēzekne
LV DRONE WALL CENTRE	as above	56°33.0'N 027°55.2'E	The border at Ludza
LV DRONE WALL SOUTH	as above	56°01.2'N 027°37.2'E	The border towards Belarus
LT NASAMS VILNIUS	NASAMS, AMRAAM-ER, medium range	54°39.6'N 025°14.4'E	Vilnius and its airport
LT NASAMS KRUONIS	NASAMS, AMRAAM-ER, medium range	54°49.2'N 024°13.2'E	Kruonis, Elektrėnai, Kaišiadorys, Kaunas
LT RBS 70 VISAGINAS	RBS 70 platoon	55°35.4'N 026°30.0'E	The Ignalina site
LT RBS 70 SIAULIAI	RBS 70 platoon	55°54.0'N 023°24.6'E	The air base
FI NASAMS HELSINKI	NASAMS (ItO 12), medium range	60°15.0'N 025°00.0'E	Helsinki and Helsinki-Vantaa. No authorisation needed

4. SURVEILLANCE RADARS — ALL DETECT AND TRACK; NONE IDENTIFIES

RADAR	TYPE	POSITION	WATCHES
EE GIRAFFE JOHVI	Giraffe	59°21.6'N 027°24.0'E	Low level. The Narva axis
EE GIRAFFE VORU	Giraffe	57°51.0'N 027°00.0'E	Low level. South-east Estonia
EE RADAR KELLAVERE	Ground Master 403	59°14.4'N 026°25.8'E	Northern Estonia and the Gulf; Vaindloo
EE RADAR TOIKAMAE	Ground Master 403	58°00.0'N 026°30.0'E	Southern Estonia, Lake Peipus
EE RADAR MUHU	AN/TPS-77	58°36.0'N 023°15.0'E	Western Estonia and the islands
LV WALL SENSOR NORTH	Ground Master 200	57°06.6'N 027°34.8'E	With LV DRONE WALL NORTH
LV WALL SENSOR CENTRE	Ground Master 200	56°33.6'N 027°54.0'E	With LV DRONE WALL CENTRE
LV WALL SENSOR SOUTH	Ground Master 200	56°01.8'N 027°36.0'E	With LV DRONE WALL SOUTH
LV RADAR AUDRINI	AN/TPS-77	56°35.4'N 027°14.4'E	Latgale, by Rēzekne
LV RADAR LIELVARDE	AN/TPS-77	56°46.8'N 024°51.0'E	Central Latvia
LT RADAR ANTAVERSIS	AN/TPS-77	54°40.2'N 024°04.2'E	Central Lithuania, by Kruonis
LT RADAR DEGUCIAI	AN/TPS-77	55°22.8'N 026°07.8'E	North-east Lithuania
LT SENTINEL VILNIUS	AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel	54°40.2'N 025°15.6'E	With LT NASAMS VILNIUS
LT SENTINEL KRUONIS	AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel	54°49.8'N 024°14.4'E	With LT NASAMS KRUONIS
FI RADAR VIROLAHTI	Ground Master 403	60°33.0'N 027°18.0'E	South-east Finland, by Hamina

5. WHICH WEAPON — IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE AGAINST A DRONE

ORDER	WEAPON	CARRIED BY	REMARKS
1	Gun	All fighters	Not rationed. A close pass at night on a target at 80 kt: for a crew that has it in sight
2	Drone-wall rocket	LV DRONE WALL NORTH, CENTRE, SOUTH	The cheapest missile on the plot. On the border only
3	RBS 70, Mistral, Piorun	The short-range platoons and posts	Cheap. A few miles of reach; **can miss a small target**
4	AIM-9X	PARS, ILVES	The fighter's cheap missile. Needs to be close
5	IRIS-T	LUPO, GRIPEN; EE IRIS-T IDA-VIRU (ground-launched)	Dearer. The right weapon for the Eurofighter against a drone
6	AMRAAM	PARS (AIM-120B), ILVES (AIM-120C-7), GRIPEN; NASAMS (AMRAAM-ER)	**Expensive.** For the NASAMS it is the only weapon
7	Meteor	LUPO	**The most expensive missile in the theatre.** On a foam decoy it is indefensible

(NR) **A fighter on Weapons Tight chooses for itself, and chooses the longest reach**: the Meteor or the AMRAAM, at once, on every hostile drone in range. Three decoys can cost three Meteors in two minutes. Set the fighters' weapon rules before opening fire, or allot the weapon by hand.

6. ENGAGING A SLOW, SMALL TARGET

(NR) **Fire from inside the envelope, not from its edge.** A missile fired at maximum range at a target doing 80 knots arrives with no energy left; fighter missiles fired that way have mostly been wasted, while ground-based units firing at what was in front of them have mostly hit. Limit the firing range; close first. Short-range units can miss too: do not count on one shot.

7. THE BATTERIES ON THE LINE

(NR) **EE MISTRAL NARVA** stands between Narva and Sillamäe, six miles from Narva, which lies on the border. A kill at the edge of its reach to the east drops the wreckage on Narva. **Hold that battery, or accept it: the commander's choice.** The **Latvian wall** is on the border itself: a drone is past it within minutes of becoming a target. **Narva is not defended** beyond that: it lies on the line.

8. TOWNS

(NR) No kill over or just short of: **Estonia** — Narva, Sillamäe, Jõhvi, Rakvere, Tartu, Võru, Tallinn. **Latvia** — Rēzekne, Daugavpils, Balvi, Ludza, Gulbene, Jēkabpils, Riga. **Lithuania** — Vilnius, Kaunas, Kaišiadorys, Utena, Švenčionys, Šalčininkai, Panevėžys. **Finland** — Kotka, Hamina, Kouvola, Porvoo, Helsinki. Smaller places are open country for this purpose.

ANNEX D TO OPORD 26-058 — PAGE D-3 OF D-3

E

Airspace control and civil air traffic

ANNEX E TO OPORD 26-058 · WITH THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES OF ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA AND FINLAND

1. THE AIRSPACE STAYS OPEN

(NR) No state has closed its airspace. Civil traffic flies through the operation from the first hour to the last, a flight every hour or two. **An airliner is never a target and never an unknown for long**: it is high, fast, on a straight track between two airports, and it answers.

2. CIVIL TRAFFIC

ITEM	DETAIL
Operators and callsigns	airBaltic **BTI** · Finnair **FIN** · LOT **LOT** · SAS **SAS** · Ryanair **RYR**, followed by a flight number
Airports	Riga 56°55.2'N 023°58.2'E · Helsinki-Vantaa 60°19.2'N 024°57.6'E · Vilnius 54°38.0'N 025°17.2'E · Tallinn 59°24.8'N 024°50.0'E
Routes	Riga–Helsinki · Vilnius–Riga · Helsinki–Vilnius · Tallinn–Riga · from Warsaw to Tallinn and Riga, entering near 53°42.0'N 021°24.0'E · from Stockholm to Vilnius and Tallinn, entering near 58°36.0'N 019°36.0'E
Profile	About 9,000 m, about 430 kt, direct
Against the drones	About 300 m, about 80 kt, wandering. **The two cannot be confused by anyone who looks at height and speed**

3. AIRPORTS UNDER A PUBLIC ALERT

(NR) A public alert in Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania closes that country's airport for as long as it lasts: flights to and from it are cancelled. The airlines and the airport operators count the hours, and say so. Helsinki-Vantaa is not closed by this headquarters. Annex K.

4. SATELLITE NAVIGATION

(NR) A notice to airmen is expected during the evening: **GNSS degraded over Ida-Virumaa, the Gulf of Finland and the Lithuanian–Belarusian border**. Civil crews are used to it. Our own aircraft navigate on inertial and radar near the line and **do not trust a satellite position within sight of the border**.

5. DECONFLICTION

- Fighters transit and patrol clear of the civil levels unless cleared by the CRC.
- Before any missile is fired upwards or along an airway, the controller checks what is behind the target.
- The TANKER ORBIT and both E-3A orbits are notified to civil control and kept clear by it.

F

Russian military aircraft — conduct on the line

ANNEX F TO OPORD 26-058 · EXTRACT OF REFERENCE B · LESSONS OF MARCH AND SEPTEMBER 2026

BOTTOM LINE

(NR) **Meet them, stay with them, film them, let them go.** A Russian aircraft in allied airspace is answered by a fighter beside it and a protest the next morning. **It is never fired on, and never declared hostile.**

1. VAINDLOO

(NR) Russian fighters, normally a pair, fly west along the Gulf of Finland corridor from the Leningrad region, high and fast, and return the same way. At **Vaindloo** (59°49.2'N 026°21.6'E) Estonian airspace reaches north into the corridor. Estonia reports a violation when they are inside it: transponders off, no flight plan, no radio contact. **What Tallinn asks is that an allied fighter was there.** A pair of PARS from Ämari, or ILVES from the north, airborne on our side when the warning comes, is enough.

2. THE NEMUNAS

(NR) A helicopter from Kaliningrad, low and slow along the river, may cross onto Lithuanian soil near **Jurbarkas** (55°04.8'N 022°46.2'E) for a few minutes. The Border Guard reports it. **What Vilnius asks is that an allied fighter saw it and filmed it.** LUPO from Šiauliai. The fighter that goes there flies against the Kaliningrad border: **Kaliningrad is beyond the line**, and the two-minute rule applies.

3. CONDUCT

DO	DO NOT
Be airborne and close when they arrive: close enough to identify them, to be seen and to film	Fire, lock a fire-control radar on them, or declare them hostile
Shadow them on our side for as long as they are near the line	Follow them east of the line or into Kaliningrad
Record time, position, type, what they did; call them on guard	Manoeuvre against them, cross their nose, or close to unsafe distance
Keep every weapon on Hold in any fighter sent to meet them	Leave batteries on Tight under their track with anything declared by hand

4. IF THEY DO NOT LEAVE

(NR) They will. A violation lasts minutes. Stay with them, report, and let Tallinn or Vilnius speak. **A manned aircraft brought down, theirs or anyone's, ends this operation at once**, and with it the mission's standing in all four capitals.

5. REPORTING

(NR) VISITOR on warning; TRESPASS when inside allied airspace; ESCORT when one of ours is with them. Annex J paragraph 2. The capital concerned hears of a violation from the CRC before it hears of it from Moscow.

ANNEX F TO OPORD 26-058 — PAGE F-1 OF F-1

G

Rules of engagement — aide-memoire

ANNEX G TO OPORD 26-058 · EXTRACT OF REFERENCE B

(NR) This card is an extract and an aid to memory. **It does not replace reference B.** Where the card is silent or differs, the reference governs. Italian, Turkish, Finnish, Swedish, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian units apply the same card.

BALTIC AIR DEFENCE — VALID 251600Z TO 261600Z — CARRY THIS CARD	
SERIAL 1	**Peacetime. WEAPONS HOLD is the default for every unit, in every domain.** On Hold nothing fires, even on a direct order to engage.
SERIAL 2	**WEAPONS TIGHT** is ordered by COM BAD only: fire at a contact held HOSTILE within reach, and at nothing else. **Weapons Free is never ordered.**
SERIAL 3	**Over Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, no unit fires without that government's fire authorisation in force.** It is asked for by COM BAD, lasts six hours, and is renewed on request. When it lapses, every unit over that country is on Hold.
SERIAL 4	**Over Finland, only Finnish units fire**: the Hornets (ILVES) and FI NASAMS HELSINKI, with no further authorisation. Italian, Turkish and Swedish fighters hold there.
SERIAL 5	**Never fire on a manned aircraft**: not a Russian fighter, not a helicopter, not an airliner. No fire-control radar on one; none declared hostile.
SERIAL 6	**Nothing of ours crosses the Russian or Belarusian border: no aircraft, no missile.** Kaliningrad is Russia. An aircraft that strays has two minutes to come back.
SERIAL 7	**A drone beyond the border is not a target.** It is held UNFRIENDLY. It becomes HOSTILE one to four minutes after it has crossed; a declaration made before that does not stand.
SERIAL 8	**No fire outside the four countries**: not over the open Baltic, not over Poland, not in the eastern Gulf of Finland between the Estonian and Finnish sectors.
SERIAL 9	**COM BAD may declare hostile an unidentified contact inside our airspace when he is sure it is a drone.** What is declared hostile will be shot at by every unit on Tight in reach. A contact lost and found again must be declared again.
SERIAL 10	**Debris over a town or a sensitive site is ours to answer for.** Hold fire while a drone crosses one; engage before or beyond.

A NOTE ON POSTURE

(NR) Every rule on this card exists because its breach has a name on it tomorrow morning: a Prime Minister whose airspace was fired in without a word asked; a mayor with wreckage in a street; a foreign ministry in Moscow or Minsk with a missile fragment to show; a family. **The drone that gets through is somebody else's weapon. The shot outside the rules is ours.**

REPORTING

(NR) Every shot is reported with time, position, firing unit, weapon and what was underneath. A shot fired without authorisation, outside the four countries or beyond the border, an aircraft across the line, and any aircraft with a crew brought down, are reported FLASH and in clear.

ANNEX G TO OPORD 26-058 — PAGE G-1 OF G-1

H

National authority and the fire authorisation

ANNEX H TO OPORD 26-058 · WITH THE LEGAL ADVISERS, CAOC UEDEM, AND THE FOUR MINISTRIES OF DEFENCE · EXTRACT OF REFERENCE D

1. WHOSE SKY

(NR) A state is sovereign in its airspace. In peace, bringing down an aircraft over its territory, crewed or not, is an act of that state, for which its government answers to its parliament and its courts. The Baltic Air Defence mission does not change that. **Each Baltic government lends COM BAD the right to fire in its airspace, for a limited time, on request**; it gives nothing away, and it can take it back.

2. THE AUTHORISATION

STEP	RULE
ASK	COM BAD asks the government concerned: **Tallinn, Riga or Vilnius**, one request per country. The request is acknowledged with the hour at which the Prime Minister will answer
WAIT	**Allow about twenty minutes.** A government that feels secure answers faster; one under pressure takes longer, half an hour and more. A second request while the first is pending changes nothing
GRANTED	Fire is authorised over that country **for six hours**, to a stated hour. COM BAD then opens fire himself, Annex C paragraph 6. Nothing fires merely because the authorisation exists
WARNING	The capital signals **twenty minutes before** the authorisation runs out
RENEW	A renewal may be asked **in the last half hour**, not earlier. The new six hours run on from the end of the first, without a gap if the answer arrives in time
EXPIRY	Every unit over that country is back on Weapons Hold. A standing order to its batteries resumes by itself if the authorisation is renewed
COVER	Six hours each: **four authorisations cover the twenty-four hours** in one country

3. WHAT A GOVERNMENT NOTICES

- **A shot over its territory without its authorisation.** Nothing costs more, whoever fired and whatever was hit.
- **An authorisation asked for and never needed**: six hours in which no drone flew over the country. It will be remembered at the next request.
- **An explosion on its soil**, most of all on a town or a site, and most of all with no alert given.
- **Wreckage of ours on a town.**
- A drone brought down in open country, or one that left without harm: these it counts in COM BAD's favour.

4. WITHDRAWAL

(NR) A government whose standing has collapsed **takes its airspace back**: no further authorisation for the rest of the operation, its batteries held, fighters held over its territory. The drones still come. It will warn first, and say what it wants. **If two of the three do so, the mission has failed and this headquarters will end the operation.**

5. FINLAND

(NR) Helsinki has given its own units a standing authority for the period: ILVES and FI NASAMS HELSINKI fire over Finland on COM BAD's order with nothing further to ask. The price is that **no other nation's fighter fires over Finland**. Finnish Hornets over Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania are bound by that country's authorisation like any other fighter.

6. BEYOND THE BORDER, AND AIRCRAFT WITH A CREW

(NR) No government can authorise a shot into Russian or Belarusian airspace, and none will be asked. No authorisation covers an aircraft with a crew in it. Annex G serials 5 to 7.

J

Communications and reporting

ANNEX J TO OPORD 26-058 · VALID 251600Z TO 261600Z

1. NETS

NET	PRIMARY	SECONDARY	USERS
Command	Secure satellite	HF secure	COM BAD, CAOC Uedem operations floor, AIRCOM. Secure only
Air defence	Link 16	secure landline	CRC Karmėlava, the national centres, every battery and radar
Fighter control	Link 16 / voice	251.750 UHF	LUPO, PARS, ILVES, GRIPEN, NATO MRTT 01
Early warning	Link 16	voice relay	NATO AEW 01 and 02 to the CRC. **The E-3A reports; it does not take orders on this net**
Governments	secure landline	liaison officer	TALLINN, RIGA, VILNIUS, HELSINKI. Requests, authorisations, alerts
Guard	243.000 UHF	121.500 VHF	Hailing Russian aircraft; civil emergencies. **Recorded throughout**

2. CODEWORDS

CODEWORD	MEANING
MOTH	Slow, low track approaching the line from beyond it. Followed by the axis. **Not a target**
LANTERN	A track has crossed and is held hostile. Followed by the track number (DRN-01, DRN-02… in order of appearance)
WANDERER	E-3A track report: slow, erratic course, consistent with a drone under jamming
ARROW	E-3A track report: steady course, constant speed. Followed by the heading
GREEN + country	Fire authorisation in force over that country. Followed by its hour of expiry
AMBER + country	Authorisation expires in twenty minutes
RED + country	No authorisation in force over that country: all units there on Hold
FIELD	Drone brought down, or come down, in open country or the sea. Position follows
ROOFTOP	Drone or wreckage down on a town or a sensitive site. Position follows. FLASH
SIREN + country	Public alert raised or extended in that country. Followed by its hour of end
FENCE	One of our aircraft is about to cross the NO-CROSS LINE. Turn it back
OVERSHOOT	One of our aircraft is across the line. Two minutes. FLASH
VISITOR	Russian military aircraft starting up or inbound towards the line. Followed by Vaindloo or Nemunas
TRESPASS	Russian military aircraft inside allied airspace
ESCORT	One of our fighters is with the Russian aircraft
DARK SKY	The E-3A is off station, or in transit between orbits

3. WHO SPEAKS ON THE PLOT

SENDER	WHO IT IS, AND WHAT IT SENDS
CRC KARMELAVA / CRC	COM BAD's own control centre: the opening message, kills and crashes in open country, border warnings
TALLINN, RIGA, VILNIUS	The three governments: answers to requests, expiry warnings, explosions and wreckage on their soil, their standing
HELSINKI	The Finnish government: what comes down in Finland
NATO AEW	The E-3A: track reports, time off station, relief, change of orbit
NATO	AIRCOM's reserve: tanker and fighters ordered, on station, leaving
AIR DEFENCE, FIGHTERS	Acknowledgement of a Tight or Hold order, with the number of units concerned
KYIV / OPEN SOURCES	Announcement that a Ukrainian strike is in the air
LITHUANIAN BORDER GUARD	Engines heard over Belarus; helicopter activity in Kaliningrad; a helicopter over Lithuanian soil
ESTONIAN AIR FORCE	Russian fighters starting up east of Narva; a violation at Vaindloo
VSD, VSD / SAB	State security: what a wreck was and where it was going
NOTAM / CRC	Notices to airmen: satellite navigation degraded

4. THE E-3A TRACK REPORT

(NR) **One report per drone, once**, when the E-3A has held it long enough to judge and it is no longer beyond the border. It gives the track's position and one of two descriptions: a **slow, erratic course, consistent with a drone under jamming**; or a **steady course at constant speed, with its heading**. No report comes for a track the E-3A does not hold: **silence in the north means the E-3A is in the south**, not that the north is quiet.

5. THE MORNING COUNT

(NR) At 260600Z the three capitals count the night from the log: what exploded on whose soil before that hour. A capital with nothing to count is easier to ask for the rest of the day; one with two or more is not. Nothing is sent for it.

6. OTHER REPORTS

(NR) SITREP to CAOC Uedem every four hours, info AIRCOM and the four ministries. FLASH for ROOFTOP, OVERSHOOT, TRESPASS, any shot outside Annex G and any aircraft down. The capitals hear of every explosion and every shot over their soil from the CRC **before** they hear of it from their own press.

7. EMISSION CONTROL, AUTHENTICATION AND THE RECORD

(NR) Radars active throughout: there is nothing to hide and everything to see. Challenge before any codeword is accepted on a non-secure net. The plot, the Link 16 picture, every request, every authorisation and every order to open or hold fire are recorded with their times from H-hour. **Nothing is edited.** No fire-control radar on any manned aircraft.

K

Public alert and political coordination

ANNEX K TO OPORD 26-058 · WITH AIRCOM PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL CIVIL PROTECTION

1. THE PUBLIC ALERT

ITEM	RULE
WHO	The government of **Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania** raises it for its whole country, **on COM BAD's word**. There is none for Finland in this order: Helsinki decides its own
WHAT	Sirens and telephones; people in shelter; **the airport closed, the trains stopped**
HOW LONG	**Two hours.** Each further call adds two hours to the end of the alert already running. It is given at once, with no second confirmation
WHAT IT BUYS	When a warhead comes down in a country under alert, the population was in shelter: fewer casualties, and a government that can say it warned them. It stops no drone, and changes nothing for an unarmed drone or for wreckage
WHAT IT COSTS	Money, every time, for every country: an economy stopped for two hours, flights cancelled. **If nothing flew over the country while it lasted, the government pays for it in patience**

2. WHEN TO ADVISE IT

(NR) When a track inside a country is likely to end among people and may not be stopped in time: several tracks on one axis; a track past the last battery; a track heading for a town. Not for every track that crosses: most end in a field. **An alert raised when the drone is already over the town is too late; one raised for a night in which nothing came is remembered.**

3. WHAT THE GOVERNMENTS ARE WATCHING

(NR) Each of the three will let COM BAD know how it stands. Its standing falls with every explosion on its soil, more on a town or a site, more still with no alert; with wreckage on a town; with a shot it did not authorise; with a false alarm. It rises a little with every drone brought down harmlessly or seen off, and with a night in which nothing reached the ground. **A government that warns that its standing is eroding means it.** Annex H paragraph 4.

4. WHO WILL ASK

WHO	WHAT THEY WILL ASK
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian public media (ERR, LSM, LRT)	Is Ida-Virumaa defended tonight? Will it be Rēzekne again? Are fighter missiles an efficient answer to foam drones?
Parliaments in Riga and Vilnius	Was the air defence allowed to fire before the first drone crossed? What reached the ground?
Rome and Ankara	How many missiles their detachments have left, and what they were fired at
Kyiv, Moscow and Minsk	Kyiv: regrets, and restraint over towns. Moscow and Minsk: nothing; they deny every launch and call any shot near the border a provocation
Airlines and airport operators	Are the Baltic airports open or not?
The North Atlantic Council	Figures: tracks, shots, impacts

5. LINES TO TAKE

- These drones are the consequence of a war and of jamming. They are not an attack on the Alliance, and we do not treat them as one.
- Every shot fired over a country was authorised by its government.
- Nothing of ours crossed a border.
- We do not comment on what a drone was carrying before the national authorities have examined it.

L

Meteorological and astronomical forecast

ANNEX L TO OPORD 26-058 · ORIGINATOR CAOC UEDEM METOC · ISSUED 250600ZNOV26

BOTTOM LINE

(NR) **Flyable throughout, for us and for them.** Cold, dry and mostly overcast. **The operation is fought in the dark**: about fourteen and a half hours of night, some seven hours of grey daylight, and darkness again for the last two hours. The moon is full but above the cloud. Nothing in the weather will stop a drone or hide one from radar.

1. AREA FORECAST — GULF OF FINLAND, ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, SOUTHERN FINLAND

ITEM	251600Z TO 261600Z
Cloud	Seven-tenths cover, persistent
Precipitation	None
Temperature	2°C at the surface
Sea state	3 in the Gulf of Finland, the Gulf of Riga and the open Baltic
For the drones	No effect. A piston engine at 300 metres is heard from the ground before it is seen
For visual identification	By night only at very short range. The missile posts identify by eye inside two miles at best

2. SUN — TIMES IN ZULU; LOCAL TIME IS TWO HOURS LATER

PLACE	DATE	NAUTICAL DAWN	SUNRISE	SUNSET	NAUTICAL DUSK
Tallinn	25 NOV	0454Z	0639Z	1336Z	1520Z
Tallinn	26 NOV	0456Z	0641Z	1334Z	1519Z
Riga	25 NOV	0450Z	0625Z	1355Z	1530Z
Riga	26 NOV	0451Z	0627Z	1353Z	1529Z
Vilnius	25 NOV	0440Z	0608Z	1402Z	1531Z
Vilnius	26 NOV	0441Z	0610Z	1401Z	1530Z
57°N 025°E	25 NOV	0446Z	0622Z	1351Z	1526Z
57°N 025°E	26 NOV	0448Z	0624Z	1349Z	1525Z

H-hour, 251600Z, is 1800 local: thirty to seventy minutes after the end of nautical twilight, in full night. Daylight on the 26th lasts 7 h 51 at Vilnius and 6 h 53 at Tallinn. The operation ends at 1800 local on the 26th, in darkness again.

3. MOON — AT 57°N 025°E

ITEM	25 NOV	26 NOV
Moonrise	1333Z	1440Z
Moonset	—	0925Z
Phase	Full, or one day past full. **Up for the whole of the first night, above the overcast**: light for a crew above the cloud, little for a gunner below it	

M

References, charts and abbreviations

ANNEX M TO OPORD 26-058

1. CHARTS AND REFERENCE POINTS

ITEM	DETAIL
Charts	ICAO 1:1 000 000 aeronautical charts, Baltic sheets; national 1:500 000 sheets for the border districts
Datum	WGS 84. Degrees and decimal minutes unless otherwise stated. Heights in metres, speeds in knots, distances in nautical miles
Reference points on the plot	The fourteen sensitive sites of Annex D paragraph 2 (all highlighted) · VAINDLOO · JURBARKAS · UST-LUGA · PRIMORSK · AEW S and AEW N corner points · TANKER corner points
Missions on the plot	TANKER ORBIT, a support mission left empty until the tanker is asked for. The E-3A's orbits are its own and are not COM BAD's to task

2. ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS ORDER

AEW Airborne early warning
AIRCOM NATO Allied Air Command
BAD Baltic Air Defence
CAOC Combined air operations centre
COM BAD Commander, Baltic Air Defence
CRC Control and reporting centre
DP Decision point
DTG Date-time group
FIR Flight information region
GNSS Satellite navigation
LNG Liquefied natural gas
MRTT Multi-role tanker transport
NAI Named area of interest
NASAMS Medium-range surface-to-air missile system
NOTAM Notice to airmen
NPP Nuclear power plant
PIR Priority intelligence requirement
ROE Rules of engagement
SAB Constitution Protection Bureau (Latvia)
VSD State Security Department (Lithuania)

3. OVERLAYS

(NR) Appendix 1 to Annex B (intelligence) and Appendix 1 to Annex C (operations) are bound after their annexes. The coastline, the lakes and the state borders are drawn for orientation only; lay each on the chart and register on its marks. The NO-CROSS LINE and the four sectors are those plotted at CRC Karmėlava: straight lines between points, which decide where a shot is whose. The operations overlay carries three insets at a larger scale: Ida-Virumaa, Latgale and Vilnius–Kaunas; the intelligence overlay two: Vaindloo and the Nemunas at Jurbarkas. Annex I is not used.

PROVENANCE

A fictional document for the Command: Modern Operations scenario **Baltic Jamming, 2026 — Stray Lights**, fifth scenario of the *Europe 2026* campaign, by totobimbo. It is written from inside a headquarters at 250900Z and states what a staff believed at that hour, which is not the same as what is true.

All personal names, callsigns, frequencies, codewords, serials, quotations other than the Lithuanian President's words of September 2026, and intelligence products are invented, as are the night of 25–26 November 2026, Operation STRAY LIGHTS, the post of COM BAD with one commander over the fighters and the national batteries of four countries, the exact positions of batteries and radars, the Swedish, tanker and E-3A reinforcements, and every decision of any government. CAOC Uedem, AIRCOM, the CRC at Karmėlava, the detachments at Šiauliai and Ämari, the Baltic Air Defence mission, the Latvian drone wall, the places named and the incidents of March to September 2026 cited as A1 are matters of public reporting; their presence and actions on this date are a projection. Talks on an energy truce were under way in September 2026; in this fiction none is in force. No part of this document reflects any actual order or assessment of any armed force.

ANNEX M TO OPORD 26-058 — PAGE M-1 OF M-1 — END OF ORDER